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I. INTRODUCTION
Owning to advantages of remote internet voting, it plays an important role in electronic government. In order to assess its securities and increase confidence of the voters in remote internet voting system and protocols, many researchers have paid attention to development and verification on secure remote internet voting systems and protocols [1, 2] .
The practical secure remote internet voting protocol should include privacy, completeness, soundness, fairness and invariableness, universal verifiability, receiptfreeness, coercion-resistance and resistance of denial of service attacks. Previous works focus on implementation and formal analysis of receipt-freeness and coercionresistance [1] . In the last twenty years many remote internet voting protocols [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] , claimed on their security, have been proposed. To our best knowledge, until now resistance of denial of service attacks in these remote internet voting protocols has not been analyzed.
Denial of service attacks are attacks against availability, attempting to prevent legitimate users from accessing the network and distributed system. This kind of attacks aims at rendering a network an system incapable of providing normal service by targeting either the network, bandwidth or connectivity. Denial of service attacks is simple and effective. For example, the adversary can produce many bogus messages and send to target of attack. That make the target of attack can not provide normal service for legitimate user owning to process big bogus messages. At the same time it is not easy to find the adversary and adversary can mount another type attack based on denial of service attacks, for example, man-in-the-middle attack.
In order to prevent denial of service attacks, the first step is to analyze and prove resistance of denial of service attacks in protocol, network and distributed system with formal method, and then to increase the confidence of people in its security. There are two models that can be used: symbolic model in which cryptographic primitives are ideally abstracted as black boxes and computational model based on complexity and probability theory. Computational model is complicated and is difficult to get the support of mechanized proof tools. In contrast, symbolic model is simpler than the computational model, and can sometimes benefit from mechanized proof tools support. For example: ProVerif [9] , SMV, NRL, Casper, Isabelle, Athena, Revere, SPIN, Brutus, Scyther.
In symbolic model there are mainly three formal frameworks in resistance of denial of service attacks. One is Yu-Gligor model [10] based on user agreement. The core of framework is based on access control policy. The second one is Meadows's cost-based model [11] built on the notion that a protocol is a sequence of operations with cause-effect relationships: an action by one principle usually causes a sequence of actions by another principle that incurs some cost. People pay much attention to it. The third one is Huang et al. model [12] which proposes the first automatic method of resistance of denial of service attacks with ProVerif. ProVerif is a mechanized proof of cryptographic protocol verifier based on a representation of the protocol by Horn clauses or applied pi calculus. It can deal with an unbounded number of sessions of the protocol and an unbounded message space. When ProVerif cannot prove a property, it can reconstruct an attack. ProVerif has been tested on many security protocols with very great results.
Recently Meng et al. [7] proposed a remote internet voting protocol that claims to satisfy formal definitions of key properties without physical constrains. Until now its resistance of denial of service attacks has not been analyzed. So here we use mechanized proof tool ProVerif to verify its resistance of denial of service attacks based on Huang et al. model [12] .
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
Review the formal model of resistance of denial of service attacks in security protocols. There are mainly three formal frameworks in resistance of denial of service attacks: Yu-Gligor model, Meadows's model and Huang et al. model which is the first automatic model of resistance of denial of service attacks with ProVerif. Until now resistance of denial of service attacks model based on computational model has not been proposed.
Apply the mechanized formal model proposed by Huang et al. for mechanized proof of resistance of denial of service attacks. Therefore, Meng et al. protocol is modeled in extended applied pi calculus and resistance of denial of service attacks take into account. The proof itself is performed by mechanized proof tool ProVerif.
The result we obtain is that Meng et al. protocol is not resistance of denial of service attacks because one denial of service attack is found by us. At the same time we also propose a method to prevent the denial of service attack. To our best knowledge, we are conducting the first mechanized proof of resistance of denial of service attacks in Meng et al. protocol for an unbounded number of honest and corrupted voters.
II. RELATED WORKS
In symbolic model there are mainly three formal frameworks in resistance of denial of service attacks: YuGligor model [10] based on user agreement, Meadows's cost-based model [11] , Huang et al. model [12] based on theorem proof. In computational model resistance of denial of service attacks analysis model has not been proposed. To our best knowledge until now resistance of denial of service attacks in remote voting protocol has not been analyzed.
May be one of the first attempts to formalize the notion of resistance of denial of service attacks was done by Gligor [13, 14] with maximum waiting time. He defines availability as the guaranty of a maximum specified waiting time for any operation, even in case of concurrent accesses. Then Yu and Gligor [10] propose a formal specification on resistance of denial of service attacks based on temporal logic by introduction of notion of user agreement. The core of framework is access control policy. It does not deal with denial of service attacks executed before authentication between sender and receiver in protocols, for example, SYN floods attacks. At the same time it does not support the automated tools. Bacic and Kuchta [15] argue that the core problem of resistance of denial of service attacks is resource allocation. They introduce the notion of a resource allocation monitor that has to have three reference monitor characteristics. Millen [16] extended Yu-Gligor model by representing the passage of time explicitly expressed as a finite-waiting-time policy.
Meadows [11] introduces a formal framework on resistance of denial of service attacks based on the costs spending on computation by the principles in security protocols. His model bases on fail-stop protocol. He analyzes the station to station protocol and point out that it is not resistance of denial of service attacks. But Meadows's model maybe not practical because the costs of generating a bogus message is smaller than costs of processing and verifying it, so all protocols are not resistance of denial of service attacks. Following this line, Ramachandran [17] analyzes JFK protocol and points that it is resistance of denial of service attacks with the conditions that bogus messages are handled in an appropriate way. Smith et al. [18] also analyze JFK protocol with Meadows's model. Lafrance and Mullins [19] present a method based on admissible interference for finding denial of service attacks in security protocols. Using SPPA and Meadows's framework, they introduce an information flow property called impassivity. Abadi et al. [20] use the observational-equivalence relation to formalize denial of service attacks and find JFK protocol is resistance of denial of services attacks. Tritilanunt et al. [21] and Tritilanunt [22] firstly point out that the cost analysis has only taken into account honest runs of the protocol in Meadows's model. They use the colored Petri nets to model the denial of service attacks based on costbased and time-based model and analyze HIP protocol. They find that HIP protocol is not resistance of denial of service attacks in the conditions Type 3 adversary or Type 4 adversary. Zhou et al. [23] propose a model based on strand spaces and 4-way handshakes protocol is analyzed. They find that it is not resistance of denial of service attacks.
Huang et al. [12] present the first automatic method of resistance of denial of service attacks based on theorem proof with ProVerif. They extend the applied pi calculus from the attacker contexts and process expression, and then from the view of protocol state, then propose the first automatic method of resistance of denial of service attacks based on extended applied calculus. Resistance of denial of service attacks in JFK protocol and IEEE 802.11i four-way handshake protocol are analyzed. The results they obtained are that JFK protocol is resistance of denial of service attacks and IEEE 802.11i four-way handshake protocol is not. The methods to prevent resistance of denial of service attacks in IEEE 802.11i four-way handshake protocol are proposed.
Besides the three models, Amoroso [24] emphasizes the need for specifying a service model in terms of prevent (p, c) policies as predicates concerned subjects, resources and resource consumption operations. Based on modal logic and deontic logic, Cuppens and Saurel [25] propose a formal model to formalize availability policy by predicates expression of permissions, prohibitions and obligations of subjects. Cuppens et al. [26] use the formal security model called Nomad to specify availability requirements. They mainly concern the denial of service attacks in program. Agha et al. [27] use probabilistic extension of the Maude term rewriting system to model denial of service attacks and use a sublogic of Continuous Stochastic Logic to describe the rate of success of attack and use VESTA to analyze the TCP 3 3-way Handshaking protocol and find it is not resistance of denial of services attacks. Mahimkar and Shmatikov [28] use the alternating time temporal logic to model bandwidth consumption and resource exhaustion attacks and verify JFKr with MOCHA. They find that it is resistance of denial of service attacks.
III. REVIEW OF HUANG ET AL. FORMAL MODEL
In this section we review the extended applied pi calculus, the definition of resistance of denial of service attacks, and the method of automated proof of resistance of denial of service attacks.
A. Extended Applied Pi Calculus
Here we only review adversary contexts and the process expression, the other content can be found in the reference [12] . The extended applied pi calculus is also supported by ProVerif.
Adversary contexts
In extended applied pi calculus, according to abilities of adversary, the contexts of adversary are classified into two contexts: ideal context and real context. Real context is formalized as
Real context is insecure environments. The adversary can overhear, intercept, and synthesize any message and is only limited by the constraints of the cryptographic methods used. Ideal context is formalized as
, where u n ∈ . Ideal context is secure environments. The adversary can not overhear, intercept, and synthesize any message.
Plain process
In extended applied pi calculus, it has plain processes and extended processes. Plain processes in Figure 1 are built up in a similar way to processes in the pi calculus, except that messages can contain terms and that names need not be just channel names.
The process 0 is an empty process. The process Q P is the parallel composition of P andQ . The replication !P produces an infinite number of copies of P which run in parallel. 
runs that if M and N are equal, executes P , otherwise executes 
B. Definition of Resistance of Denial of Service Attacks
j j j j k act B M O O ⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ , where , 1 , i j n ⎡ ⎤ ∈ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ and i j < .
C. Method of Automated Proof of Resistance of Denial of Service Attacks
Applying the extended applied pi calculus, the protocol can be modeled as an annotated Alice-and-Bob specification. Assume that the protocol exchanges 2n messages between principles Alice and Bob in a run. Principles Bob receives n messages i M , where
is a closed process and consists of parallel composition of any initiator processes Alice and responder processes Bob . 
,are private channels used to receive messages j M , where
. If the adversary can get the secret message Secret on the public channel c , then the adversary can launch a denial of service attacks by attacks of message i M .
IV. MODELING MENG ET AL. PROTOCOL IN EXTENDED APPLIED PI CALCULUS

A. Meng et al. protocol
In Meng et al. protocol [7] , when coerced by the adversary, the voter wants to lie about the decrypted message to a coercer and hence, escape coercion. In other word , the voter is able to decrypt the correct message from the registration authority, that is mean that all the information held by the voter when opened to a coercer, do not allow this coercer to verify the encrypted message ,or the coercer can not find the message is a fake message. Consequently, bribing or coercing the voter becomes useless from the very beginning. It includes four phases: preparation phase, registration phase, voting phase and tallying phase.
Preparation phase
The registration authority R A chooses a random
, and sets , ,
with BCP commitment scheme and sends it to randomly in bulletin board by a tappable channel. 
Tallying phase
, || ,
.After that tallying
, , Finally tallying authority T A tallies the ballot and publishes the results.
B. Function and Equational Theory
The function and equational theory is introduced in this section. We use extended applied pi calculus to model Meng et al. protocol. Figure 4 describes the functions and Figure 5 describes the equational theory in Meng et al. protocol. 
mod_inverse(mod(a, g, multi(p,q)), g, p,q) = a checksign(sign(x, PR(y, ELG)), PK(y, ELG), x) = true. ELG_dec(ELG_enc(x, PK(y, ELG), r), PR(y, ELG)) = x BCP_dec(BCP_enc(x, PK(y, BCP)), PR(y, BCP)) = x..
( )
, multi x y denotes multiplication operation.
C. Processes
The complete formal model of Meng et al. protocol in extended applied pi calculus is given in figures below. Figure 6 to 11 report the basic process including main process, voter process, corrupted voter process, registration authority process, identity issuer authority process and tallying authority process forming our of the model.
Meng et al.protocol
; ; ; Figure 6 . Main process
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The main process in Figure 6 sets up private channels ;
; ;
chVR chVII chIIR chTR and specifies how the processes are combined in parallel. chVR is the private channel between voter and registration authority. chVII is the private channel between voter and identity issuer authority. chIIR is the private channel between registration authority and identity issuer authority. chTR is the private channel between registration authority and tallying authority. At the same time the main process generates the key parameters voter for voter, reg for registration authority, tal for tallying authority. Voter process is modeled in extended applied pi calculus in Figure 7 . Each voter gets the credential id from identity issuer authority, and then sends it to registration authority. Figure 8 . The corrupted voter will register and get his secret credentials id from identity issuer authority, and then sends it to registration authority. BCP PR voter in BCP cryptosystem, sends credentials cred on a public channel c , so that the attacker can impersonate them in order to mount any sort of attack.
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The identity issue authority is modeled in Figure10. The identity issuer authority generates id and sends it to voter and tallying authority. He also publishes id bulletin board in through the channel pub ( ) ProVerif can take two formats as input. The first one is in the form of Horn and applied pi calculus. The second one is in the form of a process in an extension of the pi calculus [12, 29] . In both cases, the output of the system is essentially the same.
In this paper we use the extended pi calculus in Huang et al. model as the input of ProVerif. In order to prove resistance of denial of service attacks in Meng et al. protocol, the formal model based on the extended applied pi calculus is needed to be translated into the syntax of ProVerif and generated the ProVerif inputs in the extended pi calculus. The code in analysis of resistance of denial of service attacks in Meng et al. protocol is presented in Fig.12 .
The result of resistance of denial of service attacks in Meng et al. protocol is presented in Fig. 13 ,r2) ,ELG_BCP_PK_voter,r4) in let Bc=BCP_enc((r2,cred),BCP_PK_voter) in out(chVR2,(n2,nonceV,alphabet,Bc,sign((alphabet,Bc),ELG_PR_Reg))); let enccred=ELG_enc(cred,ELG_PK_Reg,r3) in out(chTR,(n2,nonceT,enccred,sign(enccred,ELG_PR_Reg))); out(pub,(enccred,sign(enccred,ELG_PR_Reg)))) |in(chTR,(=n1,nonceT,enccred1)); let cred1=ELG_dec(enccred1,ELG_PR_Reg) in out(chTR,(n2,nonceT,cred1)). protocol is not resistance of denial of service attacks because one denial of service attack is found by us. At the same time we also propose the method to prevent it from the denial of service attack. To our best knowledge, we are conducting the first mechanized proof of resistance of denial of service attacks in Meng et al. protocol for an unbounded number of honest and corrupted voters.
As future work, it would be interesting to formalize the security properties of remote internet voting protocols in computational model with mechanized tool CryptoVerif.
